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Abstract
We study the problem of selling a resource through an auction mechanism. The winning
buyer in turn develops this resource to generate profit. Two forms of payment are considered:
charging the winning buyer a one-time payment, or an initial payment plus a profit sharing
contract (PSC). We consider a symmetric interdependent values model with risk averse or risk
neutral buyers and a risk neutral seller. For the second price auction and the English auction,
we show that the seller’s expected total revenue from the auction where he also takes a fraction
of the positive profit is higher than the expected revenue from the auction with only a one-time
payment. Moreover, the seller can generate an even higher expected total revenue if, in addition
to taking a fraction of the positive profit, he also takes the same fraction of any loss incurred
from developing the resource. Moving beyond simple PSCs, we show that the auction with a
PSC from a very general class generates higher expected total revenue than the auction with
only a one-time payment. Finally, we show that suitable PSCs provide higher expected total
revenue than a one-time payment even when the incentives of the winning buyer to develop the
resource must be addressed by the seller.
1 Introduction
Auctions are commonly used to sell resources such as licenses to use a particular wireless spectrum
bandwidth or oil and gas drilling rights in a tract of land.1 The auction of a resource is different
from the auction of an item for consumption. A resource in turn can be developed by the winning
buyer to generate profit. Once a buyer develops the resource, the profit may become known to both
the buyer and the seller through observable elements such as sales data, quality of the resource,
market condition, etc. This raises the possibility of the seller selecting ex-ante as part of his auction
a contract that specifies how the net profit will be split ex-post between the winning buyer and the
seller.
We compare in this paper the following two forms of payment: (i) the seller either charges the
winning buyer a one-time payment at the end of the auction stage; or (ii) the seller receives an
initial payment from the winning buyer at the end of the auction stage followed by a profit-sharing
contract (henceforth, PSC) in which he additionally receives a prespecified share of the realized
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1See Cramton (1997) and Milgrom (2004) for reviews of the FCC spectrum auctions, and Porter (1995) and
Cramton (2009) for reviews of oil rights auctions.
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profit from the resource. This is motivated by a current example: the FCC spectrum auctions (e.g.,
auction 73) are of the first type, while the 3G spectrum auctions in India require that a winning
buyer pay a spectrum usage charge equal to a percentage of his profit in addition to the spectrum
acquisition fees.2 We investigate whether or not there are economic reasons for the seller to prefer
auctions with a PSC over auctions with only a one-time payment. The solution to this problem is
nontrivial because strategic buyers adjust their bids in the auction stage in response to the payment
they are required to make according to the PSC.
We address this problem using the symmetric interdependent values model of Milgrom and
Weber (1982). This model includes two extremes as special cases – the independent private value
model and the pure common value model – as well as a continuum of interdependent value models
between these two extremes. The value of the resource to a buyer is not known to him before it
is developed. However, each buyer has some information about the resource, known only to him.
This information may be informative to other buyers as it can refine their respective estimates.
The value of the resource to the winning buyer is publicly observable once it is developed by him.
We work with risk averse or risk neutral buyers and a risk neutral seller; the seller of the resource
is usually a large organization (e.g., the government of a country) with large cash reserves and
possibly owns multiple such resources.
Our prime focus is on two simple PSCs. First is a profit only sharing contract (henceforth,
POSC) where the seller takes a fixed fraction α ∈ (0, 1) of the positive profit from the winning
buyer but does not take any negative profit (loss) from him. Second is a profit and loss sharing
contract (henceforth, PLSC) where the seller takes a fraction α ∈ (0, 1) of both positive and negative
profit from the winning buyer. For the second price and the English auctions, we show that:
(i) The seller’s expected total revenue from the auction with a POSC or a PLSC is nondecreasing
in the share fraction α ∈ (0, 1), and in particular, is higher than the expected revenue from
the auction with only a one-time payment (i.e., α = 0). Hence, there are economic reasons to
prefer a POSC or a PLSC over only a one-time payment.
(ii) For the same share fraction α ∈ (0, 1), the auction with a PLSC generates higher expected
total revenue than the auction with a POSC. We show that the revenue superiority of the
PLSC for a given α over the corresponding POSC primarily stems from the joint effect of
positive dependence between the values and the signals that is assumed in this paper, and
the nature of PLSC and POSC; the effect of risk aversion is aligned with these factors. This
revenue superiority is shown to hold strictly in an example in Section 3.3 with risk neutral
buyers.
(iii) We leverage the intuition gained from the analysis of the POSC and PLSC to move beyond
simple PSCs and show that the auction with a PSC from a very general class generates higher
expected total revenue than the auction with only a one-time payment. Moreover, the PLSC
with the share fraction α is revenue optimal over the general class of PSCs for which the
seller’s marginal share is bounded by α. The seller can therefore accomplish all of his goals
in revenue enhancement using linear sharing contracts.
An obvious question is: “If the value of the resource ultimately becomes known to the seller,
then why not simply tax ex-post the entire profit from the resource, subject only to participation
2See Federal Communications Commission (2007) and Department of Telecommunications (2008) for details.
constraints on the buyers?” This scenario in fact results by letting the share fraction α in the
POCS or PLSC approach one.3 There are several reasons why it is worthwhile to consider a share
fraction α less than one and other nontrivial PSCs between the seller and the winning buyer,
some of which are enumerated in Section 5. A primary reason is that development of the resource
requires effort or expertise from the winning buyer; otherwise, the seller might not need to sell
the resource. Section 7 models the relationship between the winning buyer and the seller using a
principal-agent model. We show through an example that the revenue maximizing share fraction α
in either a POSC or a PLSC can be strictly less than one because of the necessity of providing
proper incentives to the winning buyer to develop the resource. However, a one-time payment is
never revenue optimal: we show that in our principal-agent model, the auction with a PLSC and a
suitably small share fraction α generates higher expected total revenue than the auction with only
a one-time payment.4 The advantages of the PSCs thus carry over to the case in which seller must
provide the winning buyer with incentives to develop the resource.
Related work: There are a number of approaches in the literature to increase the seller’s
revenue, either by exploiting the informational structure or by making payments contingent on
the ex-post realization of the values. The distinguishing aspects of our work are: allowing for risk
aversion among buyers; a substantially more general informational environment;5 consideration
of very general transfers ex-post; analysis for the second price and the English auctions; and
consideration of the incentives of the winning buyer to develop the resource.
There are two sets of papers especially relevant to our work. The first set of papers use a
mechanism design approach to maximize revenue for the seller. For the cases of statistically de-
pendent private values, a common value model in which the types of the buyers are independent
conditional on the common value, and interdependent values with statistically dependent types, the
seller can extract the full surplus from the buyers using one-time payments.6 The Wilson critique
of mechanism design (Wilson (1987)) is useful for distinguishing our approach from the papers on
full surplus extraction. While these papers define transfers between the seller and the buyers in
terms of the probability distribution of their types, our approach instead uses two common auctions
that are defined without reference to the buyers’ beliefs.7 Along with a fractional sharing contract,
these auctions are the sort of simple and familiar trading procedures that Wilson advocates.
Mezzetti (2007) considers a model in which the value of the item to any risk neutral buyer is
a function of his type and the types of the other buyers; a buyer who receives the item realizes its
3The case of α = 1 is mathematically degenerate in our model. Since the seller takes the entire profit ex-post
from the winning buyer, a buyer will either decline to participate or place any bid that gives him zero profit. The
dependence of a buyer’s bid upon his signal in our analysis of the case of α < 1 therefore does not apply for α = 1.
4As explained in Section 7, it is difficult to analyze more general PSCs or even the POSC in a principal-agent
relationship. A numerical example in Section 7 suggests, however, that: (i) as with the PLSC, a POSC with sufficiently
small share fraction α produces more expected revenue for the seller than a one-time payment; (ii) for fixed α, a
POSC causes the winning buyer to choose a larger effort than the corresponding PLSC and may thereby produce a
larger expected revenue for the seller. The generality of these two observations remains to be explored.
5While most of the revenue ranking results in auction theory are through applications of the linkage principle
(see Krishna (2002)) and assume various smoothness conditions, our proofs rely entirely on the properties of concave
functions and stochastic ordering with no or only mild assumptions of smoothness.
6See Cre´mer and McLean (1988, 1985), McAfee et al. (1989), and McAfee and Reny (1992) for details.
7Except in the special case of independent private values, however, the two auctions that we consider require that
the buyers have common knowledge of their beliefs in formulating their bids. The work on full surplus extraction made
honest reporting into a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium; while making an honest report does not require that common
knowledge of beliefs among buyers, this common knowledge is required if a buyer is to verify that honest reporting
is incentive compatible.
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value ex-post. Mezzetti proposes a two-stage reporting procedure in which all buyers first report
their types followed by a subsequent report by the winning buyer of the item’s realized value. All
losing buyers are compelled to pay a large fine ex-post if the reported value of the winning buyer
is inconsistent with the earlier reports by the losing buyers. This insures honest reporting by all
buyers and allows full surplus extraction. Practically, however, one must question the willingness
of buyers to participate in a mechanism in which they may be required to pay a large fine ex-post
depending upon: (i) the reports of the other buyers in the first stage; (ii) the ex-post report of the
winning buyer who, while having no incentive to lie, also has no incentive to be honest.
The second set of papers use ex-post transfers to enhance the revenue of the seller. Hansen
(1985) constructs examples of an oil tract sale and the sale of a firm to other firms. It is shown in
each example that the seller benefits by retaining a share of the profit from the future enterprise.
The examples are restricted to the cases of independent private values with risk neutral buyers.
Riley (1988) shows in a symmetric interdependent values model that if the value of a resource is
observed ex-post, even if imperfectly, then the seller can increase his expected revenue in a first
price auction by either requiring a winning buyer to pay a predetermined royalty or by having the
buyer establish a royalty rate through bidding. Along with using an auction mechanism different
from what we use, Riley’s analysis is restricted to risk-neutral buyers and linear ex-post transfers.
Ex-post information is also used by McAfee and McMillan (1986) and Laffont and Tirole (1987)
to analyze procurement auctions in which the winning bidder privately exerts effort to reduce his
costs. This raises the principal-agent issue that is mentioned above. These papers demonstrate
that the auctioneer can profit from contracting a cost-sharing arrangement with the winning bidder.
Both papers, however, are limited to the case of independent private values, which is ill-suited to
modeling the sale of resources such as spectrum bandwidth or mineral rights. Moreover, each paper
assumes specific utility functions for the bidder.8 McAfee and McMillan’s cost sharing contract is
closely related to the PLSC, though they consider the first price auction. Our analysis of the PLSC
in a principal-agent relationship is for the second price auction and the English auction.
DeMarzo et al. (2005) considers the first and the second price auctions in which bids are selected
from a completely ordered family of securities whose ultimate values are tied to the resource being
auctioned. DeMarzo et al. define a partial ordering based on the notion of steepness and show
that the steeper family of securities provides higher expected revenue to the seller. The two stage
payment rules that we consider can be viewed as securities and our revenue ranking of different PSCs
is consistent with their idea of steepness. Our paper is more general in allowing for risk aversion
among buyers and in its substantially less restrictive informational assumptions. The generality
of our informational model is significant for more than mathematical reasons: Abhishek et al.
(2011) shows that the revenue ranking of DeMarzo et al. (2005) does not necessarily hold if its
informational environment is relaxed. Thus, while our results are consistent with theirs, they do
not follow from their results. We also complement their work by analyzing the English auction.
Outline of this paper: The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our
model, notation, and definitions. Section 3 analyzes the second price auction with a POSC and with
a PLSC, obtains an equilibrium strategy of the buyers, and establishes the revenue consequences of
these two PSCs. Section 4 extends the results of Section 3 to the English auction. Section 5 provides
comments and extensions of our model. Section 6 studies the revenue consequences of general PSCs.
8McAfee and McMillan (1986) assumes that each bidder either has the same constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA) function as his utility of money or each bidder is risk neutral, while Laffont and Tirole (1987) assumes risk
neutrality.
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Section 7 analyzes auctions with PSCs in a principal-agent relationship. We conclude in Section 8.
2 Model and Notation
Consider N buyers competing for a resource that a seller wants to sell. The value xn of the resource
to a buyer n is a realization of a random variable Xn, unknown to him. This is the profit to buyer n
from developing the resource in the absence of any payments to the seller, but after taking into
account the variable costs. The Xn’s can take negative values, with the interpretation as loss
incurred from developing the resource. Buyer n privately observes a signal yn through a realization
of a random variable Yn that is correlated with (X1,X2, . . . ,XN ). The joint cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of the random variables Xn’s and Yn’s is common knowledge.
Let x , (x1, x2, . . . , xN ) denote a vector of values; denote the random vector (X1,X2, . . . ,XN )
by X. A vector of signals y and the random vector Y are defined similarly. We use the standard
game theoretic notation of x−n , (x1, . . . , xn−1, xn+1, . . . , xN ). Similar interpretations are used for
X−n, y−n, and Y−n. Let FX,Y(x,y) denote the joint CDF of (X,Y). It is assumed to have the
following symmetry property:
Assumption 1. The joint CDF of (Xn, Yn,Y−n), denoted by FXn,Yn,Y−n(xn, yn,y−n), is identical
for each n and is symmetric in the last N − 1 components y−n.
Assumption 1 allows for a special dependence between the value of the resource to a buyer and
his own signal, while the identities of other buyers are irrelevant to him. The model reduces to the
independent private values model if (Xn, Yn) is independent of (X−n,Y−n) for all n, to the pure
common value model if X1 = X2 = . . . = XN , and includes a continuum of interdependent value
models between these two extremes. Because of Assumption 1, the subsequent assumptions and
the analysis in the paper is given from buyer 1’s viewpoint.
The set of possible values that each random variable Yn can take is assumed to be an interval
IY ⊂ R. Assume that the joint probability density function (pdf) of the random vector Y, denoted
by fY(y), exists and is positive for all y ∈ I
N
Y . Notice that fY(y) is symmetric in its N arguments.
The random variables (Xn, Yn,Y−n) are not required to have a joint pdf. In particular, this allows
Xn to take discrete values or to be a deterministic function of (Yn,Y−n).
Let larger numerical values of the signals correspond to more favorable estimates of the value
of the resource. Mathematically, we assume the following form of positive dependence between the
value of the resource and the buyers’ signals:
Assumption 2. For any increasing function h : R 7→ R, an’s, and bn’s such that an, bn ∈ IY and
an ≤ bn for all n, the conditional expectation E [h(X1)|Y1 ∈ [a1, b1], Y2 ∈ [a2, b2], . . . , YN ∈ [aN , bN ]]
is increasing in a1 and b1, and nondecreasing in a−1 and b−1 whenever it exists.
9
Assumption 2 trivially implies that the random variable X1 conditioned on Y = y is increasing
in y1 and nondecreasing in y−1 in the sense of first order stochastic dominance (henceforth, FOSD).
Assumption 2 provides a common sufficient condition for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium
in both the second price and the English auctions; it actually can be relaxed into two weaker
9Throughout this paper, “increasing” means “strictly increasing” and “decreasing” means “strictly decreasing”.
While the results of the paper extend to the case in which the conditional expectation in Assumption 2 is nondecreasing
in the an’s and bn’s, the analysis is more complicated.
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conditions based on FOSD, one for the analysis of the second price auction (Lemma 1) and one for
the English auction (Lemma 6).10
An auction with a PSC has two stages:
(i) The auction stage: The first stage is an auction to decide who should get the resource
and to determine the initial payment to the seller. We focus on the second price sealed bid
auction (henceforth, just the second price auction) and the English auction.11 In a second
price auction, the buyer with the highest bid wins and pays the amount equal to the second
highest bid. An English auction is an ascending price auction with a continuously increasing
price. At each price level, a buyer decides whether to drop out or not. The price level and the
number of active buyers are publicly known at any time. The auction ends when the second
to last buyer drops out and the winner pays the price at which this happens.
(ii) The profit sharing stage: The second stage is a PSC. We use the term preliminary profit
to denote the net obtained after subtracting the auction stage payment made by the winning
buyer from the value of the resource. The seller takes a fixed fraction of the preliminary profit
(or loss) from the winning buyer.12 We assume that the preliminary profit is observed by
both the seller and the winning buyer.
A POSC and a PLSC are each specified by a share fraction α ∈ [0, 1), known to the buyers
in the auction stage. If the winning buyer makes a payment b at the end of the auction stage
and the value of the resource is revealed to be x, then the payment he makes in the second
stage in the POSC is α [x− b]+ (here, [a]+ , max{0, a}), while the payment in the PLSC is
α(x − b). Notice that α = 0 corresponds to having no profit sharing stage, i.e., the winning
buyer makes only a one-time payment at the end of the auction stage.
The buyers are assumed to be risk averse or risk neutral. Each buyer has the same von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility of money, denoted by u : R → R, which is concave (possibly linear, as in the
case of risk neutrality), increasing, and normalized so that u(0) = 0. Henceforth, we use the term
weakly risk averse to refer to risk averse or risk neutral behavior. The utility function u is over the
total profit from the two stages. The seller is assumed to be risk neutral.
In what follows, we assume that all expectations and conditional expectations of interest ex-
ist and are finite. Moreover, conditioned on any signal vector y ∈ INY , the expected utility
of a buyer from developing the resource without any payments is assumed to be positive; i.e.,
E [u(X1)|Y = y] > 0. Thus, the buyers who are competing for the resource expect to make a
positive profit from developing it and therefore willing to participate.
Finally, define the random variables Z1, Z2, . . . , ZN−1 to be the largest, second largest, . . .,
smallest among Y2, Y3, . . . , YN . Let Z , (Z1, Z2, . . . , ZN−1) and denote a realization of Z by z.
Henceforth, in any further usage, x1, ym, and zn are always in the support of random variables X1,
Ym, and Zn, respectively, for 1 ≤ m ≤ N and 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1; y and z are always in the support of
the random vectors Y and Z, respectively.
10Assumption 2 is weaker than affiliation, which is commonly assumed in the auction literature.
11There are many variants of the English auction. We work with the one used in Milgrom and Weber (1982).
12For simplicity, we only consider at this point single period profit realization with no discounting. Profit realization
over multiple time periods with discounting is discussed in Section 5.
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3 The Second Price Auction with a Profit Sharing Contract
This section characterizes the equilibrium bidding strategies in the second price auction with a
POSC and a PLSC, and then evaluates the revenue consequences for the seller. We look for a
symmetric equilibrium.
The following lemma is a consequence of Assumption 2 and is used extensively in this section.
Lemma 1. E [h(X1)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] is increasing in y1 and nondecreasing in z1 for any increasing
function h : R 7→ R for which the expectation exists.
Proof. From the definition of Z1, Z1 = z1 if and only if at least one of the Yn’s, 2 ≤ n ≤ N , is
equal to z1. Since fY(y) exists and is positive everywhere, conditioned on Z1 = z1, the probability
that two or more Yn’s are equal to z1 is zero. Hence, the event Z1 = z1 can be thought of as the
union of N − 1 disjoint events, one for each n, 2 ≤ n ≤ N , such that Yn = z1. By Assumption 1,
conditioned on Z1 = z1, each of these events occur with equal probability. Therefore,
E [h(X1)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] = E [h(X1)|Y1 = y1, Y2 = z1, Y3 < z1, Y4 < z1, . . . , YN < z1] ,
= E [h(X1)|Y1 = y1, Y2 = z1, Y3 ≤ z1, Y4 ≤ z1, . . . , YN ≤ z1] .
The result then immediately follows from Assumption 2.
3.1 Profit only sharing contract (POSC)
In a POSC, the winning buyer pays a fraction of any preliminary positive profit to the seller.
However, the seller does not bear any share of a loss. We start by defining a function s : [0, 1)×I2Y 7→
R that will be used to characterize the bidding strategies of the buyers:
s(α, y1, z1) ,
{
b : E
[
u(X1 − b− α [X1 − b]
+)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1
]
= 0
}
. (1)
Since u(X1 − b − α [X1 − b]
+) is decreasing and continuous in b, there is a unique b that makes
the expectation in (1) equal to zero. The function s(α, y1, z1) is therefore well-defined. It can be
interpreted as follows. If buyer 1 makes a payment b in the auction stage, his payment in the POSC
stage will be α [X1 − b]
+ and his total profit will be X1 − b− α [X1 − b]
+. Thus, s(α, y1, z1) is the
payment in the auction stage at which the overall expected utility of buyer 1 is zero, conditioned
on his signal being y1, and the highest signal of other buyers being z1.
The next lemma characterizes some important properties of s(α, y1, z1).
Lemma 2. The function s(α, y1, z1) is increasing in y1, nondecreasing in z1, decreasing in α, and
positive for small values of α. Moreover, for all y1, z1, and α ∈ [0, 1),
s(α, y1, z1) ≤ E [X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] , (2)
and the inequality is strict everywhere unless α = 0 and u is linear.
Proof. Since X1 − b − α [X1 − b]
+ is increasing in X1 and u is increasing, Lemma 1 implies that
E
[
u(X1 − b− α [X1 − b]
+)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1
]
is increasing in y1 and nondecreasing in z1. It imme-
diately follows from (1) that s(α, y1, z1) is increasing in y1 and nondecreasing in z1. Again, since
X1 − b− α [X1 − b]
+ is decreasing in α for X1 > b and nonincreasing in α for X1 ≤ b, (1) implies
that s(α, y1, z1) is decreasing in α.
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We assumed in Section 2 that E [u(X1)|Y = y] > 0, and so
E [u(X1)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] = E [E [u(X1)|Y = y] |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] > 0.
It follows from (1) that s(0, y1, z1) > 0. It is easy to see that s is continuous with respect to α.
Hence, s(α, y1, z1) is positive for small values of α.
Finally, (1) and an application of Jensen’s inequality gives
E
[
u
(
X1 − s(α, y1, z1)− α [X1 − s(α, y1, z1)]
+) |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] = 0,
⇒u
(
E
[
X1 − s(α, y1, z1)− α [X1 − s(α, y1, z1)]
+ |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1
])
≥ 0,
⇒E
[
X1 − s(α, y1, z1)− α [X1 − s(α, y1, z1)]
+ |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1
]
≥ 0,
⇒s(α, y1, z1) ≤ E [X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1]− αE
[
[X1 − s(α, y1, z1)]
+ |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1
]
,
⇒s(α, y1, z1) ≤ E [X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] ,
where the first inequality is strict if u is strictly concave and the last inequality is strict if a > 0.
The results of Lemma 2 can be interpreted as follows. Larger values of y1 and z1 imply that
X1 is likely to take larger values. Hence, the maximum payment that buyer 1 is willing to make in
the auction stage, assuming he also knows z1, is increasing in y1 and nondecreasing in z1. A larger
value of α corresponds to the seller taking a larger fraction of any preliminary positive profit from
the winning buyer. Buyer 1 compensates for this in the auction stage by lowering the maximum
amount he is willing to pay; i.e., s(α, y1, z1) is decreasing in α. Finally, inequality (2) states that
the maximum amount that buyer 1 is willing to pay for the resource given y1 and z1 is no more
than the expected value of the resource given y1 and z1, with equality holding only in the case of
risk neutrality and no profit sharing in the second stage.
The strategy of a buyer is a mapping from his signal to his bid. Let buyer n use strat-
egy βn : IY 7→ R for 1 ≤ n ≤ N . The next lemma characterizes an equilibrium bidding strategy
for the second price auction with a POSC. The construction here is similar to the derivation in
Milgrom and Weber (1982).
Lemma 3. Let the strategies β1, β2, . . . , βN be identical and defined by βn(yn) , s(α, yn, yn) for
all n. Then the strategy vector (β1, β2, . . . , βN ) is a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) of
the second price auction with the POSC determined by α. This is the unique symmetric equilibrium
with an increasing and differentiable strategy.
Proof. Assume that each buyer n > 1 uses the strategy βn(yn) = s(α, yn, yn). We will show that
the best response for buyer 1 is to also use the strategy β1(y1) = s(α, y1, y1).
Given y1, let buyer 1 bid b. Buyer 1 wins if b ≥ max{s(α, yn, yn) : 2 ≤ n ≤ N}.
13 From
Lemma 2, max{s(α, yn, yn) : 2 ≤ n ≤ N} = s(α, z1, z1), where z1 = max{y2, y3, . . . , yN}. Thus, the
expected utility of buyer 1 is:
E
[
u
(
X1 − s(α,Z1, Z1)− α [X1 − s(α,Z1, Z1)]
+)
1{b≥s(α,Z1,Z1)}|Y1 = y1
]
= E
[
E
[
u
(
X1 − s(α,Z1, Z1)− α [X1 − s(α,Z1, Z1)]
+) |Y1 = y1, Z1]1{b≥s(α,Z1,Z1)}|Y1 = y1] .
13Since the probability of a tie is zero, we ignore the issue of tie breaking without any effect on the analysis.
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From (1) and Lemma 2, E
[
u
(
X1 − s(α,Z1, Z1)− α [X1 − s(α,Z1, Z1)]
+) |Y1 = y1, Z1] is positive
for Z1 < y1 and negative for Z1 > y1. Thus, the expected utility is uniquely maximized by setting
b = s(α, y1, y1).
Finally, consider an arbitrary symmetric equilibrium strategy vector (β̂, β̂, . . . , β̂) such that β̂(b)
is increasing and differentiable in b. We show that s(α, y1, y1) uniquely solves buyer 1’s first order
condition for maximizing his expected utility given the use of β̂ by all other buyers. Consequently,
β̂ (yn) = s(α, yn, yn) is the unique symmetric equilibrium. Define a function ψ(y1, z1) as:
ψ(y1, z1) , E
[
u
(
X1 − β̂(Z1)− α
[
X1 − β̂(Z1)
]+)
| Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1
]
. (3)
Denote the conditional pdf of Z1 given Y1 = y1 by fZ1|Y1=y1(z1). Given y1, let buyer 1 bid b. The
expected utility of buyer 1 is:
E
[
ψ(Y1, Z1)1{b≥β̂(Z1)}|Y1 = y1
]
=
∫ β̂−1(b)
−∞
ψ(y1, z1)fZ1|Y1=y1(t)dt.
The first order condition for an optimal bid b gives
ψ(y1, β̂
−1(b))fZ1|Y1=y1(β̂
−1(b))
dβ̂−1(b)
db
= 0,
⇒ψ(y1, β̂
−1(b)) = 0,
⇒E
[
u
(
X1 − b− α [X1 − b]
+ |Y1 = y1, Z1 = β̂
−1(b)
)]
= 0,
⇒b = s(α, y1, β̂
−1(b)). (4)
The second line holds because fZ1|Y1=y1(t) is positive for all t in the support of Z1, and β̂
−1(b)
is increasing in b because β̂(b) is increasing in b. The third line is from (3) and the last line is
from (1). The proof is completed by noticing that b = β̂(y1) is an optimal bid because the strategy
vector (β̂, β̂, . . . , β̂) constitutes a symmetric BNE.
It is clear from (1) that s(α, y1, y1) may be negative for larger values of α. This corresponds to
the case where buyer 1 with signal y1 finds the expected net gain from developing the resource after
accounting for the part of the positive profit to be paid to the seller, too small to compensate for the
potential loss associated with developing the resource. In such a case, buyer 1 will not participate
in the auction unless the seller pays him upon winning the auction.14 The seller, however, expects
to gain from the profit sharing stage. He may thus allow the buyers to submit negative bids and
make negative payments upon winning, as long as the seller’s expected revenue is positive. In a
second price auction with negative bids allowed, if the second highest bid is negative, by charging
the winning buyer an amount equal to the second highest bid, the seller effectively pays the winning
buyer in the auction stage. We show in Proposition 1 that with our model assumptions, the seller’s
expected total revenue is always positive under this scheme. Hence, we eliminate the issue of buyers
dropping out by allowing the buyers to submit negative bids.
By symmetry, the seller’s expected revenues from the auction stage and from the POSC stage
are the same as the expected payments made by buyer 1 in the auction stage and in the POSC
stage, respectively, conditioned on him winning the auction. In the symmetric equilibrium given by
14We thus require that the auction be interim individually rational.
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Lemma 3, buyer 1 wins if his signal is highest among all the buyers. Thus, the seller’s expected rev-
enue from the auction stage is E [s(α,Z1, Z1)|Y1 > Z1], his expected revenue from the POSC stage
is E
[
α [X1 − s(α,Z1, Z1)]
+ |Y1 > Z1
]
, and his expected total revenue from both stages, denoted by
Rposcsp (α), is:
Rposcsp (α) , E
[
s(α,Z1, Z1) + α [X1 − s(α,Z1, Z1)]
+ |Y1 > Z1
]
. (5)
Taking α = 0 corresponds to no POSC stage, i.e., the second price auction with only a one-time
payment.
Proposition 1 below summarizes the revenue consequences of the second price auction with a
POSC. The proof is in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. The following statements hold for the second price auction with a POSC and
weakly risk averse buyers:
(i) The seller’s expected revenue from the auction stage (possibly negative) is decreasing in the
share fraction α, while the expected revenue from the POSC stage is positive and increasing
in the share fraction α.
(ii) The seller’s expected total revenue from the two stages is positive and is nondecreasing in the
share fraction α; i.e., for any 0 ≤ α < α̂ < 1,
Rposcsp (α̂) ≥ R
posc
sp (α) > 0. (6)
In particular, the expected total revenue from the two stages is higher than the expected revenue
from the second price auction with only a one-time payment (i.e., Rposcsp (0)).
Inequality (6) holds even for values of α close to one. At these values, the second highest bid
can be negative and the seller might have to pay the winning buyer in the auction stage. However,
the seller extracts a large expected revenue from the POSC stage and his expected total revenue is
still positive.
3.2 Profit and loss sharing contract (PLSC)
Next, we consider the case where the seller takes a fraction of both any preliminary positive profit
as well as any preliminary loss from the winning buyer. As in Section 3.1, we define a function
t : [0, 1) × I2Y → R that will be used to characterize the bidding strategies of the buyers:
t(α, y1, z1) , {b : E [u ((1− α)(X1 − b)) |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] = 0} . (7)
Since u((1 − α)(X1 − b)) is decreasing and continuous in b, there is a unique b that makes the
expectation in (7) equal to zero. The function t(α, y1, z1) is therefore well-defined. It can be
interpreted as follows. If buyer 1 makes a payment b in the auction stage, his payment in the PLSC
stage will be α(X1 − b), and his total profit will be X1 − b− α(X1 − b) = (1 − α)(X1 − b). Thus,
t(α, y1, z1) is the payment in the auction stage at which the overall expected utility of buyer 1 is
zero, conditioned on his signal being y1, and the highest signal of other buyers being z1.
The next lemma characterizes some important properties of t(α, y1, z1).
Lemma 4. The function t(α, y1, z1) is increasing in y1, nondecreasing in z1, nondecreasing in α
(increasing if u is strictly concave), and positive everywhere. Moreover, for all y1, z1, and α ∈ [0, 1),
s(α, y1, z1) ≤ t(α, y1, z1) ≤ E [X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] , (8)
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where s(α, y1, z1) is defined by (1). The left inequality above is strict everywhere except for α = 0,
and the right inequality is strict if u is strictly concave.
Proof. From Lemma 1, E [u((1 − α)(X1 − b))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] is increasing in y1 and nondecreasing
in z1. Then (7) implies that t(α, y1, z1) is increasing in y1 and nondecreasing in z1. Next, let α
and α̂ be such that 0 ≤ α < α̂ < 1. Since u is concave,
u((1− α̂)(X1 − t(α, y1, z1))) = u
((
1− α̂
1− α
)
(1− α)(X1 − t(α, y1, z1))
)
,
≥
(
1− α̂
1− α
)
u ((1− α)(X1 − t(α, y1, z1))) +
(
1−
1− α̂
1− α
)
u(0),
=
(
1− α̂
1− α
)
u ((1− α)(X1 − t(α, y1, z1))) , (9)
where the inequality is strict if u is strictly concave. From (7) and (9),
E [u((1− α̂)(X1 − t(α, y1, z1)))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1]
≥
(
1− α̂
1− α
)
E [u((1− α)(X1 − t(α, y1, z1)))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] = 0.
E [u((1− α)(X1 − b))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] is a decreasing function of b. Then from (7), we must have
t(α̂, y1, z1) ≥ t(α, y1, z1). This shows that t(α, y1, z1) is nondecreasing in α (increasing in α if u is
strictly concave).
From (1) and (7), s(0, y1, z1) = t(0, y1, z1). Since s is decreasing in α while t is nondecreasing
in α, we get t(α, y1, z1) ≥ t(0, y1, z1) = s(0, y1, z1) > 0. Hence, t(α, y1, z1) is positive everywhere.
Moreover, t(α, y1, z1) ≥ s(α, y1, z1), where the equality holds only at α = 0. Finally, Jensen’s
inequality and (7) imply
u((1− α)(E [X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1]− t(α, y1, z1)))
≥ E [u((1− α)(X1 − t(α, y1, z1)))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] = 0,
which establishes the second inequality (strict inequality if u is strictly concave).
Recall from Lemma 2 that the payment s(α, y1, z1) that makes buyer 1 indifferent to winning in
a POSC given y1 and z1 is nonincreasing in the share fraction α; buyer 1 can only be willing to pay
less as the seller takes a larger share in the POSC stage. The corresponding payment t(α, y1, z1) in
the PLSC, however, can only remain constant or increase as the share fraction α increases. This
is because a larger α not only reduces his preliminary positive profits but also shields him from
preliminary losses. If buyers are strictly risk averse, then a larger α allows buyer 1 to make a
strictly larger payment, reflecting the additional benefit that he receives from transferring risk to
the seller.
As in Section 3.1, let βn denote the strategy of buyer n, for each n. The next lemma characterizes
an equilibrium bidding strategy for the second price auction with a PLSC.
Lemma 5. Let the strategy of a buyer n be βn(yn) = t(α, yn, yn). Then the strategy vector
(β1, β2, . . . , βN ) is a symmetric BNE of the second price auction with the PLSC determined by α.
This equilibrium is the unique symmetric equilibrium with an increasing and differentiable strategy.
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Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3 and is obtained by using the function t(α, y1, z1)
instead of the function s(α, y1, z1).
The equilibrium bid t(α, yn, yn) in a PLSC is always positive. Unlike a POSC, the issue of
buyers either dropping out or the seller allowing the buyers to submit negative bids does not arise
here.
Again, by symmetry, the seller’s expected revenues from the auction stage and from the PLSC
stage are the same as the expected payments made by buyer 1 in the auction stage and in the
PLSC stage, respectively, conditioned on him winning the auction. In the symmetric equilibrium
given by Lemma 5, buyer 1 wins if his signal is highest among all the buyers. Thus, the seller’s
expected revenue from the auction stage is E [t(α,Z1, Z1)|Y1 > Z1], his expected revenue from the
PLSC stage is E [α(X1 − t(α,Z1, Z1))|Y1 > Z1], and his expected total revenue from both stages,
denoted by Rplscsp (α), is:
Rplscsp (α) , E [αX1 + (1− α)t(α,Z1, Z1)|Y1 > Z1] . (10)
Again, α = 0 corresponds to the second price auction with only a one-time payment, and so
Rplscsp (0) = R
posc
sp (0).
Proposition 2 below summarizes the revenue consequences of the second price auction with a
PLSC. The proof is in Appendix B.
Proposition 2. The following statements hold for the second price auction with a PLSC and weakly
risk averse buyers:
(i) The seller’s expected revenue from the auction stage is positive and is nondecreasing in the
share fraction α. The expected revenue from the PLSC stage is also positive.
(ii) The seller’s expected total revenue from the two stages is positive and is increasing in the
share fraction α; i.e., for any 0 ≤ α < α̂ < 1,
Rplscsp (α̂) > R
plsc
sp (α). (11)
In particular, the expected total revenue from the two stages is higher than the expected revenue
from the second price auction with only a one-time payment (i.e., Rplscsp (0)).
A natural question now is: How does the second price auction with a PLSC compare with
the second price auction with a POSC in terms of the expected total revenue they generate for
the same share fraction α? The two procedures are identical at α = 0. For α ∈ (0, 1), since
t(α,Z1, Z1) > s(α,Z1, Z1), the seller’s expected revenue from the auction stage is higher in the case
of a PLSC than a POSC. However, α(X1− t(α,Z1, Z1)) < α [X1 − s(α,Z1, Z1)]
+. Thus, the seller’s
expected revenue from the profit sharing stage is higher in the case of a POSC than a PLSC. As a
result, it is not immediately clear how the expected total revenue from the two stages in the PLSC
compares with the expected total revenue from the POSC. The next proposition resolves this issue.
It shows that in the PLSC, the gain from the higher bidding in the auction stage outweighs the
loss in revenue in the PLSC stage. The proof is in Appendix C.
Proposition 3. The second price auction with a PLSC and weakly risk averse buyers generates
higher expected total revenue than the second price auction with a POSC and weakly risk averse
buyers; i.e., for any α ∈ (0, 1),
Rplscsp (α) ≥ R
posc
sp (α). (12)
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3.3 Revenue ranking for risk neutral buyers
The seller is risk neutral in our model while the buyers are weakly risk averse. The return to the
winning buyer is less risky in the PLSC determined by α > 0 than in the corresponding POSC. In
the case of strictly risk averse buyers, the PLSC thus creates more potential gains from risk sharing
than the POSC. This suggests that the ranking (12) reflects a successful effort by the seller to
garner a portion of these gains in the form of higher revenue by using a PLSC. We explain below,
however, why (12) holds even in the case of risk neutral buyers as a consequence of the form of
positive dependence among signals and return assumed in Section 2, and the nature of PLSC and
POSC. This is followed by an example in which (12) holds strictly in the case of risk neutral buyers.
The effect of risk sharing on revenue is thus aligned with but not the primary cause of this ranking.
Fix a share fraction α > 0 and consider y1 > z1, i.e., buyer 1 wins in both the POSC and the
PLSC. Let rposc(x1) and r
plsc(x1) be the ex-post total revenue to the seller from the POSC and the
PLSC respectively, if the value X1 of the resource is equal to x1:
rposc(x1) , s(α, z1, z1) + α [x1 − s(α, z1, z1)]
+ , (13)
rplsc(x1) , t(α, z1, z1) + α(x1 − t(α, z1, z1)). (14)
Buyer 1 in each case pays in the auction stage the bid of the buyer who observed z1. This is equal
to s(α, z1, z1) in the POSC and t(α, z1, z1) in the PLSC. In our symmetric model with risk neutral
buyer (i.e., u(x) = x), s(α, z1, z1) and t(α, z1, z1) are the bids that would make buyer 1 indifferent
to winning conditioned on Y1 = Z1 = z1 in the POSC and the PLSC, respectively:
E
[
X1 − s(α, z1, z1)− α [X1 − s(α, z1, z1)]
+ | Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1
]
= 0, (15)
E [X1 − t(α, z1, z1)− α(X1 − t(α, z1, z1)) | Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1] = 0. (16)
Equations (15) and (16) together imply that the difference rplsc(x1)− r
posc(x1) satisfies:
E
[
rplsc(X1)− r
posc(X1) | Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1
]
= 0. (17)
The seller would thus expect to receive the same revenue from the PLSC as in the POSC if the
highest and the second highest signals are the same, i.e., Y1 = Z1 = z1. The event in which he
sells to buyer 1, however, is defined by Y1 > Z1. The difference r
plsc(x1) − r
posc(x1) is a line with
slope α for x1 < s(α, z1, z1) and constant for x1 ≥ s(α, z1, z1); it is therefore nondecreasing for all
x1 and increasing for x1 < s(α, z1, z1). It can then be shown using Lemma 1 the left side of (17) is
nondecreasing in buyer 1’s signal Y1; i.e.,
E
[
rplsc(X1)− r
posc(X1) | Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1
]
≥ 0
for y1 > z1. The PLSC with share fraction α therefore generates a higher expected revenue than
the corresponding POSC.
Example 1. Consider two risk neutral buyers. The signals Y1 and Y2 are independent and uni-
formly distributed in (0, 1). Given the signals of the buyers, the value of the resource to buyer 1 and
buyer 2 are Bernoulli random variables X1 and X2 respectively, with P [X1 = 1|Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2] =
(2y1 + y2)/3 and P [X2 = 1|Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2] = (y1 + 2y2)/3. Clearly, Assumptions 1 and 2 are
satisfied. Also, Z1 = Y2.
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For the second price auction with the POSC determined by α, the function s(α, y1, z1) is ob-
tained as follows:
s(α, y1, z1) =
{
b : E
[
X1 − b− α [X1 − b]
+ |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1
]
= 0
}
,
=
{
b :
2y1 + z1
3
− b− α(1 − b)
2y1 + z1
3
= 0
}
,
=
(1− α)(2y1 + z1)
3− α(2y1 + z1)
.
Thus, buyer 1 bids (1 − α)y1/(1 − αy1) if his signal is y1 and buyer 2 bids (1 − α)y2/(1 − αy2) if
his signal is y2. The seller’s expected revenue from the auction stage is:
E
[
(1− α)min(Y1, Y2)
1− αmin(Y1, Y2)
]
= 2(1− α)
∫ 1
0
θ(1− θ)
1− αθ
dθ.
Here, we have used the fact that the pdf of min(Y1, Y2) is 2(1 − θ) for θ ∈ (0, 1). The seller’s
expected revenue from the POSC stage is:
E
[
α
[
X1 −
(1− α)Y2
1− αY2
]+ ∣∣∣∣Y1 > Y2
]
= 2αE
[
2Y1 + Y2
3
(
1−
(1− α)Y2
1− αY2
)
1{Y1>Y2}
]
.
Since E
[
(2Y1 + Y2)1{Y1>Y2}|Y2
]
= (1−Y2)(1+ 2Y2), the above expression can be further simplified
to
5α
9
−
2α(1 − α)
3
E
[
Y2(1− Y2)(1 + 2Y2)
1− αY2
]
=
5α
9
−
2α(1 − α)
3
∫ 1
0
θ(1− θ)(1 + 2θ)
1− αθ
dθ.
With some further (tedious) algebra, one can get closed form expressions for the seller’s expected
revenue from the auction stage and the seller’s revenue from the POSC stage.
For the second price auction with the PLSC determined by α, the function t(α, y1, z1) is obtained
as follows:
t(α, y1, z1) = {b : E [(1− α)(X1 − b)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] = 0} ,
=
2y1 + z1
3
.
As a consequence, each buyer bids his signal. The seller’s expected revenue from the auction stage
is:
E [min(Y1, Y2)] =
1
3
.
The seller’s expected revenue from the PLSC stage is:
E [α(X1 − Y2)|Y1 > Y2] = 2αE
[(
2Y1 + Y2
3
− Y2
)
1{Y1>Y2}
]
=
2α
9
.
The results are plotted in Figure 1. For POSC, it can be seen that as α increases, the expected
revenue from the auction stage decreases while the revenue from the POSC stage increases. How-
ever, the expected total revenue is increasing in α. In particular, the expected total revenue with
α > 0 is higher than the expected total revenue with α = 0, i.e., the second price auction with only
a one-time payment. For PLSC, the expected revenue from the auction stage and the expected
total revenue are increasing in α. The expected total revenue from the second price auction with
a PLSC is strictly higher than the expected total revenue from the second price auction with a
POSC; they agree only at α = 0, the case of only a one-time payment, and in the limiting case of
α→ 1, the case of full profit extraction.
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Figure 1: Revenue from the second price auction with a POSC and a PLSC as a function of the share
fraction α.
4 The English Auction with a Profit Sharing Contract
This section extends the results of Section 3 to the English auction. In an English auction, the
prices at which different buyers drop out provide information to the remaining buyers. A buyer’s
bidding strategy takes into account the number of active buyers and the prices at which the other
buyers have dropped out. Again, we look for a symmetric equilibrium.
The following lemma is a consequence of Assumption 2. It plays a role similar to that of
Lemma 1 in Section 3.
Lemma 6. E [h(X1)|Y1 = y1,Z = z] is increasing in y1 and nondecreasing in z (componentwise)
for any increasing function h : R 7→ R for which the expectation exists.
Proof. Recall the definition of Z from section 2. The proof follows trivially from Assumptions 1
and 2.
We now analyze the English auction with a POSC and a PLSC. Paralleling Section 3.1 and
Section 3.2, we (re)define functions s : [0, 1)×INY → R and t : [0, 1)×I
N
Y → R that will be used to
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characterize the bidding strategy of buyer 1:
s(α, y1, z) ,
{
b : E
[
u
(
X1 − b− α [X1 − b]
+) |Y1 = y1,Z = z] = 0} . (18)
t(α, y1, z) , {b : E [u ((1− α)(X1 − b)) |Y1 = y1,Z = z] = 0} . (19)
The functions s(α, y1, z) and t(α, y1, z) are well-defined for reasons similar to those in Sections 3.1
and 3.2 respectively. These are the maximum payments that buyer 1 is willing to pay in the
auction stage under the POSC and PLSC, respectively, given that his signal is y1 and the signals
of everyone else is z (the assignment of these signals to the buyers is irrelevant). The next lemma
characterizes some important properties of s(α, y1, z) and t(α, y1, z). The results are fairly intuitive
and explanations similar to those for Lemma 2 and Lemma 4 apply.
Lemma 7. The function s(α, y1, z), defined by (18), is increasing in y1, nondecreasing in z, de-
creasing in α, and positive for small values of α. The function t(α, y1, z), defined by (19), is
increasing in y1, nondecreasing in z, nondecreasing in α (increasing if u is strictly concave), and
is always positive. Moreover, for all y1, z, and α ∈ [0, 1),
s(α, y1, z) ≤ t(α, y1, z) ≤ E [X1|Y1 = y1,Z = z] , (20)
where the left inequality is strict everywhere except for α = 0, and the right inequality is strict if u
is strictly concave.
Proof. The properties of s(α, y1, z) follow from Lemma 6, (18), and concavity of u. The sequence
of arguments is similar to how Lemma 1, (1), and concavity of u are used to prove Lemma 2. The
properties of t(α, y1, z) follow from Lemma 6, (19), and concavity of u. The sequence of arguments
is similar to how Lemma 1, (7), and concavity of u are used to prove Lemma 4.
In an English auction, the price of the resource increases continuously during the bidding
stage. At each price level, a buyer decides whether to drop out or not, depending on his sig-
nal and the prices at which other buyers have dropped out. Let p1 ≤ p2 ≤ . . . ≤ pN−1 be
the prices at which the first, second, . . ., last drop out occurs. The strategy of a buyer n
now is a vector βn , (β
2
n, β
3
n, . . . , β
N
n ) of functions β
k
n : R
N−k+1 → R, 2 ≤ k ≤ N . Here,
βkn(yn, pN−k, pN−k−1, . . . , p1) is the price at which buyer n drops out as a function of his signal
yn and the prices (pN−k, pN−k−1, . . . , p1) at which the N − k drop outs have occurred. The next
lemma characterizes an equilibrium bidding strategy for the English auction with a POSC and a
PLSC. The construction is similar to how an equilibrium bidding strategy for the English auction
is characterized in Milgrom and Weber (1982).
Lemma 8. Let p1 ≤ p2 ≤ . . . ≤ pN−1 be the prices at which buyers drop out. Define q1 ≤ q2 ≤
. . . ≤ qN−1 recursively as follows:
q1 ,
{
b : s
(
α, b, b, . . . , b︸ ︷︷ ︸
N times
)
= p1
}
,
qk ,
{
b : s
(
α, b, b, . . . , b︸ ︷︷ ︸
N-k+1 times
, qk−1, qk2 , . . . , q1
)
= pk
}
, for 2 ≤ k ≤ N − 1. (21)
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Let the strategy of each buyer n be defined recursively as follows:
βNn (yn) = s
(
α, yn, yn, . . . , yn︸ ︷︷ ︸
N times
)
,
βkn(yn, pN−k, pN−k−1, . . . , p1) = s
(
α, yn, yn, . . . , yn︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
, qN−k, qN−k−1, . . . , q1
)
for 2 ≤ k ≤ N − 1.
(22)
Then (β1,β2, . . . ,βN ) is a symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the English auction
with the POSC determined by α. A symmetric PBE of the English auction with the PLSC deter-
mined by α is characterized similarly by defining the qk’s and the β
k
n’s using t(α, y1, z).
Proof. We only give the proof for the English auction with a POSC. The proof for the English
auction with a PLSC is similar.
Assume that each buyer n > 1 use the strategy βn. We will show that an optimal response of
buyer 1 is to use the strategy β1. Notice that the qk’s are well-defined as s(α, y1, z) is increasing
in y1 and nondecreasing in z.
Since each buyer n > 1 uses the same increasing strategy βn, if buyer 1 wins the auction, then
it is straightforward to verify that qk = zN−k for 1 ≤ k ≤ N − 1, where zN−k is the (N − k)
th
highest signal from the signals of the buyers 2, 3, . . . , N . Thus, the qk’s are inverse mappings that
compute the signals of the buyers who drop out from the prices at which they do so. The price
that buyer 1 pays upon winning is equal to s(α, z1, z). Buyer 1 cannot influence the price he pays if
he wins the auction. From (18) and Lemma 7, the expected utility of buyer 1 is positive if y1 > z1
(here, s(α, y1, z) > s(α, z1, z)) and negative if y1 < z1 (here, s(α, y1, z) < s(α, z1, z)).
Suppose y1 > z1. Any strategy by which buyer 1 wins gives him the same positive expected
utility, while the utility is zero if he drops out. In particular, if buyer 1 uses the strategy β1, he
wins the auction. Hence, β1 is optimal if y1 > z1. Next, if y1 < z1, then any strategy by which
buyer 1 wins gives him the same negative expected utility, while the utility is zero if he drops out.
By following the strategy β1, buyer 1 drops out; more specifically, if his signal is the l
th highest,
where l ≥ 2, then buyer 1 will be (N − l)th to drop out. Thus, β1 is optimal if y1 < z1. This
completes the proof.
As in Section 3.1, we assume in the case of POSC that the seller allows the buyers to submit
negative bids and always charges the winning buyer the price at which the second to last buyer
drops out, even if it is negative. By contrast, the equilibrium bids in the PLSC are always positive.
The English auction has been shown to have infinitely many symmetric equilibria in the model
of Milgrom and Weber (1982); see, e.g., Bikhchandani et al. (2002). However, all these equilibria
are equivalent in the sense that they result in a two-stage procedure: the buyers with the lowest
N − 2 signals drop out and reveal their signals in this process and then the last two buyers carry
out the second price auction while taking into account the lowest N − 2 signals. In particular,
all such equilibria agree on the price at which the second to last buyer drops out, hence the
seller’s revenue does not depend on the choice of the equilibrium. A similar result, on the lines of
Bikhchandani et al. (2002), can be obtained for the English auction with a POSC and a PLSC in
our model. We omit the details here.
The seller’s expected revenues from the auction stage and from the profit sharing stage are
same as the expected payments made by buyer 1 in the auction stage and in the profit sharing
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stage, respectively, conditioned on him winning the auction. In the symmetric equilibrium given
by Lemma 8, buyer 1 wins if his signal is highest among all the buyers. In a POSC with the
share fraction α, the seller’s expected revenue from the auction stage is E [s(α,Z1,Z)|Y1 > Z1], his
expected revenue from the POSC stage is E
[
α [X1 − s(α,Z1,Z)]
+ |Y1 > Z1
]
, and his expected total
revenue from both stages, denoted by Rposceng (α), is:
Rposceng (α) , E
[
s(α,Z1,Z) + α [X1 − s(α,Z1,Z)]
+ |Y1 > Z1
]
, (23)
where s(α, y1, z) is given by (18). In a PLSC with the share fraction α, the seller’s expected
revenue from the auction stage is E [t(α,Z1,Z)|Y1 > Z1], his expected revenue from the PLSC
stage is E [α(X1 − t(α,Z1,Z))|Y1 > Z1], and his expected total revenue from both stages, denoted
by Rplsceng (α), is:
Rplsceng (α) , E [αX1 + (1− α)t(α,Z1,Z)|Y1 > Z1] , (24)
where t(α, y1, z) is defined by (19). Taking α = 0 corresponds to the English auction with only a
one-time payment, and so Rplsceng (0) = R
posc
eng (0).
Proposition 4 below extends the results of Propositions 1-3 to the English auction.
Proposition 4. The following statements hold in an English auction with weakly risk averse buyers:
(i) In the POSC, the seller’s expected revenue from the auction stage (possibly negative) is de-
creasing in the share fraction α; the expected revenue from the POSC stage is positive and
increasing in the share fraction α; and the expected total revenue from the two stages is positive
and nondecreasing in the share fraction α, i.e., for any 0 ≤ α < α̂ < 1,
Rposceng (α̂) ≥ R
posc
eng (α) > 0. (25)
(ii) In the PLSC, the seller’s expected revenue from the auction stage is positive and increasing in
the share fraction α; the expected revenue from the PLSC stage is positive; and the expected
total revenue from the two stages is positive and increasing in the share fraction α, i.e., for
any 0 ≤ α < α̂ < 1,
Rplsceng (α̂) > R
plsc
eng (α). (26)
(iii) The PLSC with a share fraction α generates higher expected total revenue than the POSC
with a share fraction α; i.e., for any α ∈ (0, 1),
Rplsceng (α) ≥ R
posc
eng (α). (27)
In particular, the expected total revenue from the two stages in the POSC or PLSC is higher than
the expected revenue from the English auction with only a one-time payment.
Proof. The proof of the first part of the claim follows a sequence of arguments similar to that in the
proof of Proposition 1. The necessary intermediate steps are now obtained by using Lemma 6, (18),
and the concavity of u; paralleling the use of Lemma 1, (1), and the concavity of u to prove
Proposition 1. The proof of the second part of the claim follows a sequence of arguments similar
to that in the proof of Proposition 2. The necessary intermediate steps are now obtained by using
Lemma 6 and (19), paralleling the use of Lemma 1 and (7) to prove Proposition 2. The proof of the
third part of the claim follows a sequence of arguments similar to that in the proof of Proposition 3.
The necessary intermediate steps are now obtained by using Lemma 6, (18), (19), and the concavity
of u; paralleling the use of Lemma 1, (1), (7), and the concavity of u to prove Proposition 3.
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5 Discussion
This section describes some extensions of the model and results of the previous sections.
Discounting and multiperiod profit realization: Our results for POSC and PLSC extend
directly to the case in which the seller and each buyer discounts the return from the resource
relative to the auction stage payment using a common discount factor. If the return from the
resource is generated over multiple periods, then our results extend for the PLSC by substituting
the discounted sum of per period return for the variable X1 in our analysis. A subtlety arises in the
multiple period case for the POSC: Is the winning buyer required to share a positive profit earned
period by period, or is he instead required to share only based upon the net discounted profit over
all of the periods? The distinction is simply that a positive profit in one period may be canceled
by a loss in a subsequent period. Our analysis extends in the case of POSC if a buyer is taxed
based upon discounted net profit; i.e., the winning buyer can apply losses in some periods to cancel
profits in other periods, as is common in tax law.15
Revenue comparison for the second price and the English auctions: Milgrom and Weber
(1982) shows that the English auction generates at least as much revenue as the second price auction
in the symmetric interdependent values model with affiliated signals and risk neutral buyers. This
ranking remains true for risk averse buyers as long as the utility function of each buyer has the
form of a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) function; i.e., u(x) = A(1 − exp(−cx)), where
A > 0 and c > 0. We now show that this ranking holds for the PLSC but not necessarily for the
POSC.
For a given share fraction α, a buyer values the resource in the PLSC as u˜(x) , u((1 − α)x);
the function u˜(x) then determines his bids in both the English and the second price auction. If
u(x) is linear (as in the case of risk neutrality) or a CARA function, then u˜(x) is also linear or
a CARA function, respectively. Let tsp(α, y1, z1) denote the strategy function defined by (7) for
the second price auction with the PLSC determined by α and teng(α, y1, z) denote the strategy
function defined by (19) for the English auction with the PLSC determined by α. Assuming that
X1, Y1, Y2, . . . , YN are affiliated, the arguments in Milgrom and Weber (1982) implies that if u˜(x)
is linear or a CARA function,
tsp(α, y1, z1) ≤ E [teng(α, y1, z1,Z−1)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] .
This inequality together with affiliation imply that for y1 > z1,
tsp(α, z1, z1) ≤ E [teng(α, z1, z1,Z−1)|Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1] ≤ E [teng(α, z1, z1,Z−1)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] ,
⇒ E [αX1 + (1− α)tsp(α,Z1, Z1)|Y1 > Z1] ≤ E [αX1 + (1− α)teng(α,Z1,Z)|Y1 > Z1] ,
⇒ Rplscsp (α) ≤ R
plsc
eng (α).
15For 1 ≤ t ≤ T , let the random variable Xn(t) be the return from the resource to buyer n in time period t and
δ ∈ (0, 1] be the common discount factor. If buyer 1 wins the auction, makes a payment b in the auction stage, and
reports a preliminary profit X1(t)−b(t) in time period t, then the b(t)’s must satisfy b =
∑
T
t=1
δtb(t). The total profit
of buyer 1 from T time periods, relative to the auction stage payment, is (1−α)
(∑
T
t=1
δtX1(t)− b
)
in the PLSC and
is
∑
T
t=1
αδt [X1(t)− b(t)]
+ in the POSC with period by period profit sharing. The subtlety with the POSC arises
because
∑
T
t=1
αδt [X1(t)− b(t)]
+
≥ α[
∑
T
t=1
δtX1(t)− b]
+, for T ≥ 2.
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The expected total revenue from the English auction with a PLSC is therefore higher than the
expected total revenue from the second price auction with the same PLSC.
In the POSC, however, a buyer uses the function û(x) , u(x−α [x]+) to determine his bid which
is not necessarily linear or CARA even if u(x) has one of these properties. As a consequence, the
revenue ranking of the English auction and the second price auction depends upon the underlying
distribution of the random variables (X1,Y).
Limits on the choice of the share fraction: Both the POSC and the PLSC share the property
that the seller can obtain an arbitrarily large fraction of the surplus generated by the resource by
choosing the share fraction α that is sufficiently close to one. We noted in Section 1, however, that
the choice of α may be constrained by the need to provide incentives to the winning buyer for the
proper development of the resource; Section 7 provides a formal analysis of PSCs on these lines.
Here, we enumerate a number of other reasons that may constrain a seller in his choice of the share
fraction α.
A seller-nation, for instance, may be constrained by law or philosophy concerning its proper role
in private enterprise. This is related to the incentives to the winning buyer, for a common argument
against state-run businesses concerns their long-run incentives for efficient operation. In the 3G
spectrum auction in India, for instance, the spectrum usage shares retained by the government are
in the range of 3-8% (see Department of Telecommunications (2008)). It is increasingly common for
nations to retain significant ownership shares in natural resources such as oil and minerals, e.g., in
the 2005 Libyan auction, production shares retained by the govermnment ranged from 61.1-89.2%
(Cramton (2009)). A buyer may also have an outside option that bounds below the amount of
profit he must expect to earn in order to participate in the auction. Finally, we model the seller as
risk neutral; if he is instead strictly risk averse, then his optimal choice of the share fraction α will
share the risk of the venture between the seller and the winning buyer.
An alternative perspective on our work is to interpret the share fraction α as a tax rate.
Limited taxes on corporate earnings are common, and so a converse question must be asked: Do
existing taxes on a corporation’s earnings increase the government’s revenue despite the fact that
it diminishes the value of obtaining a resource to a corporate bidder and thereby decreases its bid
in the auction? Our work shows that the revenue from a variety of forms of corporate income taxes
can outweigh the negative effect of taxes on bids for government resources.16
6 General Profit Sharing Contracts
This section leverages the intuition gained from Section 3 to study the revenue consequences of a
general class of PSCs. The discussion here is restricted to the second price auction; the results,
however, easily extend to the English auction, in the same way that Section 4 extends the results
of Section 3 to the English auction.
Consider a PSC φ : R→ R. If the winning buyer makes a payment b at the end of the auction
stage and the value of the resource is revealed to be x, then the payment he makes to the seller in
the profit sharing stage is φ(x− b). The function φ is an admissible PSC if it satisfies the following
properties:
16Unlike corporate income taxes, a PSC can be designed for a specific resource sale. It can also be used in
conjunction with existing corporate taxes. See Grimm and Schmidt (2000) for an analysis of the effect of income
taxes upon government auction revenue in an independent private values model with risk neutral buyers.
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(i) φ(w) is nondecreasing in w and w − φ(w) is increasing in w.
(ii) φ(0) = 0 and limw→∞ φ(w) =∞.
(iii) φ is continuous on R.
Property (i) says that the payment made to the seller in the profit sharing stage is nondecreasing
in the preliminary profit. Moreover, the total profit of the winning buyer is increasing in the
preliminary profit. Property (ii) says that if the preliminary profit is zero then no payment is made
to the seller, and a large payment is made to the seller if the preliminary profit is large. Notice
that φ(w) = α [w]+ corresponds to the POSC determined by α and φ(w) = αw corresponds to the
PLSC determined by α. Both POSCs and PLSCs are admissible PSCs for α ∈ (0, 1).
Given an admissible PSC φ, define a function s : I2Y 7→ R, similar to (1) and (7), as follows:
s(y1, z1;φ) , {b : E [u(X1 − b− φ(X1 − b))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] = 0} . (28)
Since X1 − b − φ(X1 − b) is decreasing and continuous in b, there is a unique b that makes the
expectation in (28) equal to zero. Hence s(y1, z1;φ) is well-defined. As in the proof of Lemma 2,
it can be shown that s(y1, z1;φ) is increasing in y1 and nondecreasing in z1. Moreover, paralleling
the proof of Lemma 3, the strategy βn(yn) , s(yn, yn;φ) for all n can be shown to constitute a
symmetric BNE of the second price auction with an admissible PSC φ. The seller’s expected total
revenue from the auction stage and the profit sharing stage combined, denoted by Rsp(φ), is:
Rsp(φ) , E [s(Z1, Z1;φ) + φ(X1 − s(Z1, Z1;φ))|Y1 > Z1] . (29)
Denote the revenue from the second price auction with only a one-time payment (i.e., φ(w) = 0
for all w) by Rsp(0) = E [s(Z1, Z1; 0)|Y1 > Z1].
17 Also, notice that Rsp(0) = R
posc
sp (0) = R
plsc
sp (0),
where Rposcsp is given by (5) and R
plsc
sp is given by (10).
The Proposition 5 below summarizes the revenue consequences of the second price auction with
an admissible PSC. The proof is outlined in Appendix D.
Proposition 5. The following statements holds for the second price auction with an admissible
PSC φ and weakly risk averse buyers:
(i) Rsp(φ) ≥ Rsp(0) > 0.
(ii) If there exists some α ∈ (0, 1) such that φ(w+ δ)− φ(w) ≤ αδ for all w and δ, then Rsp(φ) ≤
Rplscsp (α), where R
plsc
sp (α) is given by (10).
As pointed out in Section 1, there are many factors that can go into choosing a PSC. However,
Proposition 5 shows that for any admissible PSC, the seller’s expected total revenue from the two
stages is positive and is higher than the revenue from the second price auction with only a one-time
payment. Moreover, if the payment rate to the seller in the profit sharing stage is bounded from
above by some α ∈ (0, 1) (e.g, if φ
′
(w) ≤ α for all w), then the seller’s expected total revenue is
bounded above by the PLSC determined by α. This is a sense in which restricting attention to
PLSCs among admissible PSCs need not diminish the expected revenue of the seller.
17φ(w) = 0 for all w is not an admissible PSC as it does not satisfy limw→∞ φ(w) =∞.
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7 Principal-Agent Relationship and PSCs
This section explores how the necessity of providing incentives to the winning buyer for developing
the resource affects the choice of the share fraction α for the PLSC. As noted in Section 1, the
seller may need the expertise of the winning buyer in developing the resource. The effort of the
winning buyer may not be fully observable to the seller. The auction and subsequent sharing
contract are then components in a principal-agent relationship that must address the incentives
provided to the winning buyer. While a comprehensive analysis of auctions with general PSCs in
a principal-agent relationship is beyond the scope of this paper, we focus here on analyzing the
revenue consequences of the PLSC in a principal-agent relationship. We first show that a one-time
payment (i.e., α = 0) can never be revenue optimal in the principal-agent relationship: a PLSC
with a small share fraction α gives a higher expected total revenue to the seller than the auction
with only a one-time payment. Next, we show through an example that if sufficiently large gains
can be realized by the winning buyer’s effort, then the revenue maximizing share fraction α is
strictly less than one. We conclude with some discussion on extending the analysis to the case of
POSC. Again, the presentation here is restricted to the second price auction; the results, however,
easily extend to the English auction.
Following McAfee and McMillan (1986), assume that the winning buyer exerts an effort e ∈
E ⊂ R to obtain an additive improvement in the realized value of the resource; i.e., if buyer n wins
and exerts an effort e, then the value of the resource to him is a realization of the random variable
Xn+ e. We use the term nominal value to denote a realization of Xn and effort-generated value to
denote a realization of Xn + e. The seller can verify the effort-generated value but not the effort e
itself. The randomness in the nominal value conceals the winning buyer’s effort from the seller,
thereby preventing the seller from enforcing the effort that he deems optimal.18 Let c(e) be the
monetary cost to the winning buyer of providing the effort e. The cost function c is the same for
each buyer n and is known to the seller. However, since the effort e is unverifiable, the cost c(e)
cannot be verified by the seller and hence cannot be included in the PLSC; the winning buyer bears
the full cost of exerting an effort. If the winning buyer makes a payment b at the end of the auction
stage, exerts an effort e, and the nominal value of the resource to him is x, then the payment he
makes in the second stage in the PLSC with share fraction α is α(x+ e− b) and his total profit is:
x+ e− b− α(x+ e− b)− c(e) = (1− α)(x− b) + (1− α)e − c(e). (30)
This implies that the winning buyer’s optimum effort must maximize (1 − α)e − c(e) and can
therefore be chosen independently of his signal as well as any other information he acquires from
participating in the auction.
We make the following regularity assumptions on the cost function and the information structure
in addition to those made in Section 2:
Assumption 3. The set IX of possible values of the random variable X1, the set IY of possible
values of the random variable Y1, and the set E of possible choices of effort e are closed and bounded
subintervals of R.
Assumption 4. For any continuous function h : R 7→ R, an’s, and bn’s such that an, bn ∈ IY and
an ≤ bn for all n, the conditional expectation E [h(X1)|Y1 ∈ [a1, b1], Y2 ∈ [a2, b2], . . . , YN ∈ [aN , bN ]]
is continuous in the an’s and bn’s whenever it exists.
18We assume in this section that Xn is a continuous random variable. If Xn is discrete, then the seller might infer
the effort e from knowing the discrete values that Xn can take and the realization of Xn + e.
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Assumption 5. The cost function c is nonnegative, increasing, convex, and continuously differen-
tiable. Furthermore, the marginal cost c′(e) satisfies infe∈E c
′(e) < 1 and supe∈E c
′(e) > 1.
Assumption 3 insures that an optimum effort exists and is finite. Assumptions 3 and 4 allow
the derivate to be moved inside the expectation in the proofs in Appendix E. Assumption 5 is
standard for cost functions; it also avoids the trivial scenario where the optimum effort is always
an end point of E and does not depend on the share fraction α.
Because of Assumptions 3 and 5, there exists for each α ∈ [0, 1) a unique effort e(α) that
maximizes (1 − α)e − c(e). The optimum effort e(α) is nonincreasing in the share fraction α; a
higher share fraction α reduces the incentive for the winning buyer to exert effort to improve the
value realized from the resource. Let κ(α) denote the net gain to the winning buyer from exerting
the optimum effort:
κ(α) , max
e∈E
(
(1− α)e − c(e)
)
= (1− α)e(α) − c(e(α)). (31)
The total profit of the winning buyer under the optimum effort, given that he makes a payment b at
the end of the auction stage and the nominal value of the resource is x, equals (1−α)(x−b)+κ(α).
As in Section 3.2, we (re)define the function t : [0, 1)×I2Y → R that will be used to characterize
the bidding strategies of the buyers:
t(α, y1, z1) , {b : E [u ((1− α)(X1 − b) + κ(α)) |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] = 0} . (32)
The function t(α, y1, z1) is well-defined. It is continuous in y1 and z1 by Assumption 4, increas-
ing in y1, and nondecreasing in z1. Paralleling the proof of Lemma 5, the strategy βn(yn) ,
t(α, yn, yn) for all n can be shown to constitute a symmetric BNE of the second price auction with
the PLSC given by α and the above principal-agent relationship. The seller’s expected revenue
from the auction stage is E [t(α,Z1, Z1)|Y1 > Z1], his expected revenue from the PLSC stage is
E [α(X1 + e(α)− t(α,Z1, Z1))|Y1 > Z1], and his expected total revenue from both stages under the
principal-agent relationship, denoted by Rplscsp−pa(α), is:
Rplscsp−pa(α) , E [αX1 + αe(α) + (1− α)t(α,Z1, Z1)|Y1 > Z1] , (33)
where t(α, y1, z1) is given by (32).
Proposition 6 below shows that the expected total revenue Rplscsp−pa(α) is strictly increasing in α
for α near zero. Even with the necessity of providing incentives for effort to the winning buyer, it
is therefore always the case that a PLSC with a small positive share fraction α produces a greater
expected total revenue for the seller than a second-price auction with a one-time payment. The
proof is in Appendix E.
Proposition 6. The following inequality holds for the second price auction with a PLSC and weakly
risk averse buyers in the presence of the principal-agent relationship:
dRplscsp−pa(α)
dα
∣∣
α=0
> 0.
The following example provides insight into the expected revenue Rplscsp−pa(α) as a function of
the share fraction α.
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Example 2. Consider two risk neutral buyers. The random variables Y1 and Y2, denoting the
signals of the buyers, are independent and uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. Given the signals (y1, y2),
the random variables X1 and X2, denoting the nominal value of the resource to the buyers, are
independent and uniformly distributed in [0, y1 + y2]. By definition, Z1 = Y2. The cost function
c(e) equals γe2 for some γ > 0.
It is straightforward to verify that
e(α) =
1− α
2γ
, κ(α) =
(1− α)2
4γ
, t(α, y1, z1) =
y1 + z1
2
+
1− α
4γ
. (34)
Thus, buyer 1 bids y1 + (1 − α)/(4γ) if his signal is y1 and buyer 2 bids y2 + (1 − α)/(4γ) if his
signal is y2. The seller’s expected revenue from the auction stage is:
E [min(Y1, Y2)] +
1− α
4γ
=
1
3
+
1− α
4γ
.
The seller’s expected revenue from the PLSC stage is:
E
[
α
(
X1 + e(α) − Y2 −
1− α
4γ
) ∣∣∣∣Y1 > Y2] = 2αE [(X1 − Y2 + 1− α4γ
)
1{Y1>Y2}
]
.
Since E
[
X11{Y1>Y2}|Y1, Y2
]
= (Y1 + Y2)1{Y1>Y2}/2, the above expression can be further simplified
to
α(1 − α)
4γ
+ αE
[
(Y1 − Y2)1{Y1>Y2}
]
=
α(1 − α)
4γ
+ α
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
y2
(y1 − y2)dy1dy2 =
α(1− α)
4γ
+
α
6
.
The seller’s expected total revenue is:
Rplscsp−pa(α) =
1
3
+
1− α
4γ
+
α(1− α)
4γ
+
α
6
=
1
3
+
1
4γ
+
α
6
−
α2
4γ
. (35)
The right hand side of (35) is maximized at α = γ/3.
We make the following observations concerning this example:
(i) If the cost parameter γ is sufficiently small (i.e., γ < 3), then the share fraction α = γ/3 that
maximizes the seller’s expected total revenue is strictly less than one. From (34), the optimum
effort e(α) increases as γ decreases. A small value of γ models the case in which output per
monetary cost of effort is relatively high. This results in a large effort-generated value of
the resource and in turn higher bids in the auction stage. The seller in this case prefers to
provide a greater incentive to develop the resource by choosing a small share fraction α and
reaps the benefits through a higher auction stage revenue together with a larger expected
effort-generated value.
(ii) If the cost parameter γ is large (i.e., γ ≥ 3), then the seller’s expected total revenue is
increasing in the share fraction α for α ∈ [0, 1). In this case, the gain from exerting effort is
small and the dependence of the revenue on the share fraction α is on the lines of the results
of Section 3.2.
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(iii) The expected total revenue is strictly increasing in α for α ∈ [0,min(γ/3, 1)). As shown more
generally in Proposition 6, the share fraction α = 0 is never revenue optimal for γ > 0.
A complication arises in analyzing the auction with a POSC in the presence of the principal-
agent relationship. A key simplification in the case of PLSC is that the optimum effort of the
winning buyer depends on the share fraction α and the cost function but not on the signals or
values of the buyers. The winning buyer therefore does not need to draw any inference from the
auction stage in order to select his effort. In contrast to (30), the winning buyer’s total profit in a
POSC is:
x+ e− b− α [x+ e− b]+ − c(e). (36)
Because the sign of x + e − b depends on the nominal value x, the optimum effort e may depend
upon x or the winning buyer’s beliefs about x.
We consider two alternative stages in the POSC at which the winning buyer chooses his effort.
It is perhaps most plausible to assume that he chooses his effort after winning the auction but
before the realization of the nominal value. His choice of effort in this case depends upon his
beliefs about the nominal value, which may be influenced by any inference that he can draw from
the price that he pays in the auction stage. Assuming that all buyers use the same symmetric
increasing bidding strategy, the winning buyer can infer the second highest signal from the price.
His choice of effort therefore depends upon the equilibrium bidding strategy, and the equilibrium
bidding strategy depends upon the expected profit that will be generated when effort is chosen
optimally. The bidding strategy and the subsequent choice of the optimum effort are in this way
tightly coupled and must be derived simultaneously, which is difficult.
Alternatively, consider the case in which the winning buyer observes the realization of his
nominal value before choosing his effort. While this case is admittedly restrictive as a model of a
principal and an agent, it retains the essential features of the hidden action and consequent moral
hazard that distinguishes this relationship; we explore this special case in the hope that its results
may generalize to richer models. The nominal value observed by the winning buyer outweighs any
information that can be inferred from bids and the optimum effort again becomes independent of
the bidding strategy. Appendix F analyzes the POSC in this case using the informational setup of
Example 2. Three observations can be made concerning this example:
(i) Numerical computations demonstrate that a POSC with a suitably small share fraction α
generates a higher expected revenue for the seller than a one-time payment. This example
therefore suggests that Proposition 6 extends to the case of the POSC. The calculations also
demonstrate that the revenue-maximizing share fraction α for the seller is strictly less than
one for sufficiently small values of the cost parameter γ.
(ii) The difference between the winning buyer’s total profit in the POSC and the PLSC for the
same share fraction α and effort e is min{0, α(x + e − b)}, which is the fraction of the loss
that the seller absorbs in the PLSC if the winning buyer suffers a loss. The marginal profit
from exerting effort can only be larger in the POSC than in the PLSC. As a consequence, the
winning buyer’s optimum effort can only be larger in the POSC. A POSC is in this sense more
effective for the seller than a PLSC as a means of eliciting effort from the winning buyer.
(iii) The larger optimum effort by the winning buyer in the POSC produces a larger effort-
generated value for the resource in comparison to the PLSC. As a consequence, the revenue
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superiority of the PLSC over the POSC can be reversed when the auction is followed by a
principal-agent relationship. The reversal of the revenue ranking is observed for small values
of γ and large values of α. For large values of the cost parameter γ, the gain from exerting
effort is small and the dependence of the revenue on the share fraction α is on the lines of the
results of Proposition 3.
Point (i) supports this paper’s emphasis on the advantages for the seller of profit-sharing in
comparison to a one-time payment. Point (ii) holds in general for the POSC and the PLSC with
this principal-agent model. Point (iii) is a noteworthy point concerning the relative properties of
the POSC and the PLSC that may prove practically relevant to the seller’s design of a PSC in the
presence of the principal-agent relationship. The generality of points (i) and (iii) beyond Example 2
and for a more richer principal-agent model remains to be explored.
8 Conclusions
We have shown for the second price auction and the English auction that a seller can increase his
revenue from selling a resource by retaining a share of the ex-post positive profit realized from the
resource. The seller can gain even further by committing ex-ante to share both losses and positive
profits with the winning buyer. Our analysis is conducted for a symmetric interdependent values
model that includes the cases of independent private values and a pure common value as special
cases, and we consider a range of different sharing rules with which the seller retains a portion of
the realized value of the resource. The generality of the sharing rule is important both because
extraneous constraints may bind the seller in its selection or because the sharing must provide the
winning buyer with the proper incentives for developing and reporting upon the resource. While
such incentives considerations do influence the choice of the ex-post sharing rule, sharing a small
fraction of losses and positive profits with the winning buyer is always better for the seller than no
ex-post sharing.
A Proof of Proposition 1
The first part of Proposition 1 follows trivially from Lemma 2. Lemma 9 and Lemma 10 provide
the key steps for the second part.
Lemma 9 (from Ohlin (1969)). Let W be a real random variable taking values in some interval
J1, and let gi : J1 7→ J2 for i = 1, 2 be nondecreasing functions with values in some interval J2.
Suppose −∞ < E [g1(W )] = E [g2(W )] <∞. Let h be a concave function such that E [h(gi(W ))] is
well-defined for i = 1, 2. If there exists w0 such that g1(w) ≥ g2(w) for w < w0 and g1(w) ≤ g2(w)
for w > w0, then E [h(g1(W ))] ≥ E [h(g2(W ))]. If h is strictly concave and P [g1(W ) 6= g2(W )] > 0,
then the inequality is strict.
Lemma 10. For any given y1 and z1, s(α, y1, z1) + αE
[
[X1 − s(α, y1, z1)]
+ | Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1
]
is
nondecreasing in α, where s(α, y1, z1) is defined by (1).
Proof. Consider α̂ > α, α̂ ∈ (0, 1). To simplify the notation, define a random variable V whose
probability distribution is identical to the conditional distribution of X1 given Y1 = y1 and Z1 = z1.
Let b̂ , s(α̂, y1, z1).
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Since b + α[V − b]+ is increasing in b, b + αE [[V − b]+] is in turn increasing in b. There is a
unique b˜ that satisfies:
b˜+ αE
[
[V − b˜]+
]
= b̂+ α̂E
[
[V − b̂]+
]
. (37)
To prove Lemma 10, it suffices to show that s(α, y1, z1) ≤ b˜. From (1), this holds if and only if
E
[
u(V − b˜− α[V − b˜]+)
]
≤ 0. (38)
If b˜ < b̂, then
b˜+ αE
[
[V − b˜]+
]
< b̂+ αE
[
[V − b̂]+
]
≤ b̂+ α̂E
[
[V − b̂]+
]
,
which contradicts (37). Hence b˜ ≥ b̂.
From (37),
E
[
V − b˜− α[V − b˜]+
]
= E
[
V − b̂− α̂[V − b̂]+
]
.
Moreover,
V − b˜− α[V − b˜]+ − (V − b̂− α̂[V − b̂]+) = b̂− b˜+ α̂[V − b̂]+ − α[V − b˜]+.
Since α̂ > α and b˜ ≥ b̂, the right hand side of the above equation is nonnegative for large positive
values of V , nonpositive for large negative values of V , and changes sign at most once. Lemma 9
then implies
E
[
u(V − b˜− α[V − b˜]+)
]
≤ E
[
u(V − b̂− α̂[V − b̂]+)
]
= 0,
where the last equality follows from the definition of b̂. This establishes (38) and the proof is
complete.
We can now prove part (ii) of Proposition 1. From Lemma 10, for any y1 > z1 and 0 ≤ α <
α̂ < 1,
s(α, z1, z1)− s(α̂, z1, z1) ≤ E
[
α̂ [X1 − s(α̂, z1, z1)]
+ − α [X1 − s(α, z1, z1)]
+ |Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1
]
,
≤ E
[
α̂ [X1 − s(α̂, z1, z1)]
+ − α [X1 − s(α, z1, z1)]
+ |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1
]
.
(39)
The expectation in the second line is conditioned on Y1 = y1 and not Y1 = z1. Lemma 2
implies s(α̂, z1, z1) < s(α, z1, z1) for α̂ > α, from which it follows that α̂ [X1 − s(α̂, z1, z1)]
+ −
α [X1 − s(α, z1, z1)]
+ is nondecreasing in X1. The inequality (39) then applies Lemma 1. Now,
Rposcsp (α̂) = E
[
s(α̂, Z1, Z1) + α̂ [X1 − s(α̂, Z1, Z1)]
+ |Y1 > Z1
]
= E
[
E
[
s(α̂, Z1, Z1) + α̂ [X1 − s(α̂, Z1, Z1)]
+ |Y1, Z1
]
|Y1 > Z1
]
,
≥ E
[
E
[
s(α,Z1, Z1) + α [X1 − s(α,Z1, Z1)]
+ |Y1, Z1
]
|Y1 > Z1
]
,
= E
[
s(α,Z1, Z1) + α [X1 − s(α,Z1, Z1)]
+ |Y1 > Z1
]
,
= Rposcsp (α),
where the inequality is from (39). Finally, from Lemma 2, s(0, z1, z1) > 0. Hence, R
posc
sp (0) > 0 and
Rposcsp (α) ≥ R
posc
sp (0) > 0. This completes the proof.
27
B Proof of Proposition 2
Part (i) follows trivially from Lemma 4. Turning to part (ii), the seller’s expected revenue from the
PLSC stage is:
E [α(X1 − t(α,Z1, Z1))|Y1 > Z1] = E [E [α(X1 − t(α,Z1, Z1))|Y1, Z1] |Y1 > Z1] ,
= E [α(E [X1|Y1, Z1]− t(α,Z1, Z1))|Y1 > Z1] .
For Y1 > Z1, Lemma 4 implies that E [X1|Y1, Z1] ≥ t(α, Y1, Z1) > t(α,Z1, Z1). The expected
revenue from this tage is therefore positive.
The seller’s expected total revenue is given by:
Rplscsp (α) = E [t(α,Z1, Z1) + α(X1 − t(α,Z1, Z1))|Y1 > Z1] ,
= E [E [αX1 + (1− α)t(α,Z1, Z1)|Y1, Z1] |Y1 > Z1] ,
= E [αE [X1|Y1, Z1] + (1− α)t(α,Z1, Z1)|Y1 > Z1] . (40)
Consider 0 ≤ α < α̂ < 1. Since E [X1|Y1, Z1] > t(α,Z1, Z1) for all α ∈ [0, 1) and t(α,Z1, Z1) is
nondecreasing in α, we get
αE [X1|Y1, Z1] + (1− α)t(α,Z1, Z1) < α̂E [X1|Y1, Z1] + (1− α̂)t(α,Z1, Z1),
≤ α̂E [X1|Y1, Z1] + (1− α̂)t(α̂, Z1, Z1).
Hence, αE [X1|Y1, Z1] + (1− α)t(α,Z1, Z1) is increasing in α. This along with (40) imply that the
seller’s total revenue Rplscsp (α) is increasing in α. This completes the proof.
C Proof of Proposition 3
We start with the following lemma:
Lemma 11. For any α ∈ [0, 1), y1, and z1,
αE [X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] + (1− α)t(α, y1, z1)
≥ s(α, y1, z1) + αE
[
[X1 − s(α, y1, z1)]
+ |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1
]
, (41)
where s(α, y1, z1) is defined by (1) and t(α, y1, z1) is defined by (7).
Proof. From (7), E [u((1 − α)(X1 − b))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] = 0 for b = t(α, y1, z1). Then (41) is true
if and only if
E
[
u((1 − α)(X1 − bˆ))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1
]
≥ 0,
for bˆ =
1
(1− α)
(
s(α, y1, z1) + αE
[
[X1 − s(α, y1, z1)]
+ −X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1
])
.
(42)
Inequality (42) implies that t(α, y1, z1) ≥ b̂, which is equivalent to (41). To simplify the notation,
define a random variable V whose probability distribution is identical to the conditional distribution
of X1 − s(α, y1, z1) given Y1 = y1 and Z1 = z1. With this new notation, inequality (42) reduces to
E
[
u
(
(1− α)V − αE
[
[V ]+ − V
])]
≥ 0. (43)
28
The definition of s(α, y1, z1) implies that E
[
u(V − α [V ]+)
]
= 0. Also,
E
[
V − α [V ]+
]
= E
[
(1− α)V − αE
[
[V ]+ − V
]]
.
Since E
[
[V ]+ − V
]
≥ 0,
(
V − α [V ]+
)
−
(
(1− α)V − αE
[
[V ]+ − V
])
is nonnegative for positive
values of V , nonpositive for large negative values of V , and changes sign at most once. Lemma 9
then implies
E
[
u
(
(1− α)V − αE
[
[V ]+ − V
])]
≥ E
[
u(V − α [V ]+)
]
= 0.
This establishes (43) and the proof is complete.
Next, we use Lemma 11 to prove Proposition 3. Notice that
Rplscsp (α) = E [αX1 + (1− α)t(α,Z1, Z1)|Y1 > Z1] ,
= E [E [αX1 + (1− α)t(α,Z1, Z1)|Y1, Z1] |Y1 > Z1] ,
and
Rposcsp (α) = E
[
s(α,Z1, Z1) + α [X1 − s(α,Z1, Z1)]
+ |Y1 > Z1
]
,
= E
[
E
[
s(α,Z1, Z1) + α [X1 − s(α,Z1, Z1)]
+ |Y1, Z1
]
|Y1 > Z1
]
.
It suffices to show that for any y1 > z1,
E [αX1 + (1− α)t(α, z1, z1)|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1]
≥ E
[
s(α, z1, z1) + α [X1 − s(α, z1, z1)]
+ |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1
]
,
or, equivalently,
αE
[
X1 − [X1 − s(α, z1, z1)]
+ |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1
]
≥ s(α, z1, z1)− (1− α)t(α, z1, z1). (44)
From Lemma 11,
s(α, z1, z1)− (1− α)t(α, z1, z1) ≤ αE
[
X1 − [X1 − s(α, z1, z1)]
+ |Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1
]
,
≤ αE
[
X1 − [X1 − s(α, z1, z1)]
+ |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1
]
.
The expectation in the second line is conditioned on Y1 = y1 not Y1 = z1. The second inequality
follows from Lemma 1. It implies (44) and completes the proof.
D An Outline of the Proof of Proposition 5
To prove the first part of the claim, we start with the following lemma:
Lemma 12. For any admissible PSC φ,
s(y1, z1;φ) + E [φ(X1 − s(y1, z1;φ))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] ≥ s(y1, z1; 0). (45)
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Proof. The solution b to the equation E [u(X1 − b) | Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] = 0 defines s(y1, z1; 0). Since
E [u(X1 − b) | Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] is strictly decreasing in b, (45) is equivalent to
E [u(X1 − s(y1, z1;φ)− E [φ(X1 − s(y1, z1;φ))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1])|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] ≤ 0. (46)
Let V be a random variable with probability distribution identical to the conditional distribution
of X1 − s(y1, z1;φ) given Y1 = y1 and Z1 = z1. Then to establish inequality (46), we equivalently
need to show that E [u(V − E [φ(V )])] ≤ 0. The definition of s(y1, z1;φ) in (28) implies that
E [u(V − φ(V ))] = 0. Notice that φ(V ) − E [φ(V )] is nonnegative for large positive values of V ,
nonpositive for large negative values of V , and changes sign at most once. The proof is then
completed by an application of Lemma 9.
Lemma 12 and the properties of an admissible PSC can then be used to establish the first part
of the claim. The proof is similar to the use of Lemma 10 to prove Proposition 1 in the special case
of α = 0 and α̂ ∈ (0, 1). The following lemma is used to prove the second part of the claim:
Lemma 13. Let φ satisfy the condition of part (ii) of Proposition 5. Then,
(1− α)t(α, y1, z1) + αE [X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] ≥
s(y1, z1;φ) + E [φ(X1 − s(y1, z1;φ))|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] , (47)
where t(α, y1, z1) is defined by (7).
Proof. By the definition of t(α, y1, z1), inequality (47) is equivalent to
E [u((1− α)X1 − s(y1, z1;φ)− E [φ(X1 − s(y1, z1;φ))− αX1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1])|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1]
≥ 0. (48)
Let V be the random variable defined as in the proof of Lemma 12. Then to establish (48), we
equivalently need to show that E [u((1 − α)V − E [φ(V )− αV ])] ≥ 0, given E [u(V − φ(V ))] = 0.
Notice that φ(V ) ≤ αV for V ≥ 0 and φ(V ) ≥ αV for V ≤ 0. The proof is then completed by an
application of Lemma 9, as in the proof of Lemma 11.
Notice that αX1 − φ(X1 − s(y1, z1;φ)) is nondecreasing in X1. The second part of the claim is
established using Lemma 13, paralleling the use of Lemma 11 to prove Proposition 3.
E Proof of Proposition 6
The proof is by explicitly computing the derivative of Rplscsp−pa(α) at α = 0. We first verify that: the
derivate with respect to α can be taken inside the expectation in (33); and given any y1 and z1,
the function t(α, y1, z1), define by (32), is differentiable in α.
Throughout the rest of this section, we call a function differentiable on a closed interval if it is
differentiable in the interior of the interval, the right derivative exists at the left end point of the
interval, and the left derivative exists at the right end point of the interval. By Assumption 5, there
exists ǫ > 0 such that infe∈E c
′(e) < 1− ǫ. In rest of this section, this ǫ is kept fixed and α ∈ [0, ǫ]
below.
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Lemma 14. Given any y1 and z1, the function t(α, y1, z1), defined by (32), is continuously differ-
entiable in α. Moreover,
∂t(α, y1, z1)
∂α
=
(
b− e(α)
1− α
−
E [X1u
′ ((1− α)(X1 − b) + κ(α)) |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1]
(1− α)E [u′ ((1− α)(X1 − b) + κ(α)) |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1]
)
b=t(α,y1,z1)
.
(49)
Proof. For notational convenience, define a random variable V whose probability distribution is
identical to the conditional distribution of X1 given Y1 = y1 and Z1 = z1. Define a function µ(α, b)
as follows:
µ(α, b) , E
[
u
(
(1− α)(V − b) + κ(α)
)]
. (50)
We first show that the µ(α, b) is continuously differentiable and then use the implicit function
theorem to establish that the t(α, y1, z1) is continuously differentiable with respect to α.
For α ∈ [0, ǫ] the optimum effort in an interior point of E and e(α) = (c′)−1(1−α). Hence e(α)
and κ(α) are continuously differentiable in α, as is u
(
(1 − α)(V − b) + κ(α)
)
. Given any b, define
M1 as:
M1 , max
α∈[0,ǫ],v∈IX
∣∣∣∣∣∂u
(
(1− α)(v − b) + κ(α)
)
∂α
∣∣∣∣∣ . (51)
M1 is well-defined and finite as it is the maximum of a continuous function over a compact set.
From (50), given any b and 0 ≤ α˜ < α̂ ≤ ǫ,∣∣∣∣µ(α̂, b)− µ(α˜, b)α̂− α˜
∣∣∣∣ ≤ E
[∣∣∣∣∣u
(
(1− α̂)(V − b) + κ(α̂)
)
− u
(
(1− α˜)(V − b) + κ(α˜)
)
α̂− α˜
∣∣∣∣∣
]
. (52)
By the mean value theorem, for each V there is an α ∈ (α˜, α̂) such that
u
(
(1− α̂)(V − b) + κ(α̂)
)
− u
(
(1− α˜)(V − b) + κ(α˜)
)
α̂− α˜
=
∂u
(
(1− α)(V − b) + κ(α)
)
∂α
∣∣∣∣
α=α
. (53)
Combining (51)-(53), we get ∣∣∣∣µ(α̂, b)− µ(α˜, b)α̂− α˜
∣∣∣∣ ≤M1.
Then, by the dominated convergence theorem and (50),
∂µ(α, b)
∂α
= E
[
∂u
(
(1− α)(V − b) + κ(α)
)
∂α
]
= E
[
(b+ κ′(α)− V )u′ ((1− α)(V − b) + κ(α))
]
.
(54)
A similar analysis shows that the function µ(α, b) is differentiable in b. Moreover,
∂µ(α, b)
∂b
= E
[
∂u
(
(1− α)(V − b) + κ(α)
)
∂b
]
= −(1− α)E
[
u′ ((1− α)(V − b) + κ(α))
]
. (55)
The right hand sides of (54) and (55) imply that µ(α, b) is continuously differentiable and ∂µ(α, b)/∂b
6= 0. By definition, µ(α, b) = 0 for b = t(α, y1, z1). Then, by the implicit function theorem,
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t(α, y1, z1) is continuously differentiable in α, and
∂t(α, y1, z1)
∂α
= −
(
∂µ(α,b)
∂α
∂µ(α,b)
∂b
)
b=t(α,y1,z1)
,
=
(
b+ κ′(α)
1− α
−
E [X1u
′ ((1− α)(X1 − b) + κ(α)) |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1]
(1− α)E [u′ ((1− α)(X1 − b) + κ(α)) |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1]
)
b=t(α,y1,z1)
.
(56)
Finally, by the envelope theorem, κ′(α) = −e(α). Substituting this in (56) completes the proof.
Lemma 15. For any y1, z1, and α,
(1− α)
∂t(α, y1, z1)
∂α
− t(α, y1, z1) + e(α) + E [X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] ≥ 0,
where the t(α, y1, z1) is defined by (32).
Proof. From Esary et al. (1967), a single random variable is associated; hence for any pair of non-
decreasing functions g1 and g2 and any random variable W , E [g1(W )g2(W )] ≥ E [g1(W )]E [g2(W )]
whenever the expectations exist. For the random variable X1, taking g1(X1) = X1 and g2(X1) =
−u′
(
(1− α)(X1 − b) + κ(α)
)
, and noticing that −u′ is an increasing function, we get
E [X1u
′ ((1− α)(X1 − b) + κ(α)) |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1]
E [u′ ((1− α)(X1 − b) + κ(α)) |Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1]
≤ E [X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] . (57)
Combining Lemma 14 with (57) completes the proof.
Since t(α, y1, z1) is continuously differentiable in α and continuous in y1 and z1, ∂t(α, y1, z1)/∂α
is continuous in α, y1, and z1. As noted in the proof of Lemma 14, e(α) is continuously differentiable.
Hence, the function λ(α, x1, z1) , αx1 + αe(α) + (1 − α)t(α, z1, z1) is differentiable in α and the
derivate is continuous in α, x1, and z1. Using an analysis similar to the proof of Lemma 14 allows
us to change the order of expectation and the derivative with respect to α in the right hand side
of (32), resulting in
∂Rplscsp−pa(α)
∂α
= E
[
∂
(
αX1 + αe(α) + (1− α)t(α,Z1, Z1)
)
∂α
∣∣∣∣Y1 > Z1
]
,
= E
[
X1 + e(α) + αe
′(α)− t(α,Z1, Z1) + (1− α)
∂t(α,Z1, Z1)
∂α
∣∣∣∣Y1 > Z1] . (58)
To complete the proof of Proposition 6, it suffices to show that for y1 > z1,
E [X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] + e(0) − t(0, z1, z1) +
∂t(α, z1, z1)
∂α
∣∣∣∣
α=0
> 0. (59)
Using Lemma 15 with α = 0 and Y1 = z1, we get
E [X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] + e(0)− t(0, z1, z1) +
∂t(α, z1, z1)
∂α
∣∣∣∣
α=0
>
E [X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1]− E [X1|Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1] . (60)
Since E [X1|Y1 = y1, Z1 = z1] > E [X1|Y1 = z1, Z1 = z1] for y1 > z1, (59) holds and the proof is
complete.
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F Example: Principal-Agent Relationship and POSC
This section extends the analysis of Example 2 to the case of a POSC. We assume that the winning
buyer observes the nominal value of the resource before choosing his effort. Under this assumption,
the equilibrium characterization of the second price auction with a POSC and the principal-agent
relationship can be carried out for our general model with weakly risk averse buyers and a convex
cost function. We restrict attention here to the setting of Example 2 to numerically compute the
revenue in the case of POSC and for simplicity of the presentation.
The winning buyer’s total profit in the case of POSC is given by (36). Let e(α, x− b) denote his
optimum effort, given the share fraction α, the nominal value of the resource x, and the payment b
in the auction stage. A case by case analysis can be used to solve for e(α, x− b),19 resulting in:
e(α, x − b) =

1
2γ if x− b ≤ −
1
2γ ,
b− x if x− b ∈
(
− 12γ ,−
1−α
2γ
)
,
1−α
2γ if x− b ≥ −
1−α
2γ .
(61)
By contrast, the optimum effort in the case of PLSC is always equal to (1 − α)/(2γ), which is
smaller than the optimum effort e(α, x − b) in the case of POSC.
Let π(α, x − b) denote the corresponding maximum total profit of the winning buyer,
π(α, x − b) , max
e≥0
[x+ e− b− α [x+ e− b]+ − γe2],
= x+ e(α, x − b)− b− α [x+ e(α, x− b)− b]+ − γ(e(α, x − b))2. (62)
Since x+ e− b− α [x+ e− b]+ − γe2 is increasing in x− b, π(α, x − b) is increasing in x− b.
Paralleling (32), we (re)define the function s : [0, 1)×I2Y → R that will be used to characterize
the bidding strategies of the buyers in the case of POSC:
s(α, y1, y2) , {b : E [π(α,X1 − b)|Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2] = 0} . (63)
As in the proof of Lemma 3, the strategy βn(yn) , s(α, yn, yn) for all n can be shown to constitute
a symmetric BNE of the second price auction with a POSC given by α. The seller’s expected total
revenue from both stages, denoted by Rposcsp−pa(α), is:
Rposcsp−pa(α) , E
[
s(α, Y2, Y2) + α
[
X1 + e
(
α,X1 − s(α, Y2, Y2)
)
− s(α, Y2, Y2)
]+
|Y1 > Y2
]
, (64)
where s(α, y1, y2) is given by (63).
Using (61) and (63), one can numerically compute Rposcsp−pa(α). Figure 2 plots the expected total
revenue from the POSC and the PLSC for Example 2 for different values of the cost parameter γ.
Points (i)-(iii) at the end of the discussion of POSCs in Section 7 follow directly from inspection of
these figures.
19It is helpful in this derivation to notice that e − γe2 is increasing for e ≤ 1/(2γ) and decreasing otherwise; and
(1− α)e− γe2 is increasing in e for e ≤ (1− α)/(2γ) and decreasing otherwise.
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Figure 2: Revenue from the second price auction with a POSC and a PLSC as a function of the share
fraction α under the principal-agent relationship.
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